Abstract-Distributed and efficient resource allocation is critical for fully realizing the benefits of cooperative communications in large scale communication networks. This paper proposes two auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, that determine relay selection and relay power allocation in a distributed fashion. A single-relay network is considered first, and the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (i.e., the auction's outcome) are proved. It is shown that the power auction achieves the efficient allocation by maximizing the total rate increase, and the SNR auction is flexible in trading off fairness and efficiency. For both auctions, the distributed best response bid updates globally converge to the unique Nash Equilibrium in a completely asynchronous manner. The analysis is then generalized to networks with multiple relays, and the existence of the Nash Equilibrium is shown under appropriate conditions. Simulation results verify the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OOPERATIVE communications take advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels, uses relay nodes as virtual antennas, and thus realizes the benefits of multipleinput-multiple-output communications in situations where physical multiple antennas are difficult to deploy (e.g., small sensor nodes). Various cooperative protocols have been proposed (e.g., [1] - [5] ), such as amplify-and-forward, decodeand-forward, and estimate-and-forward. Although the physical layer performance of cooperative communications has been extensively studied in the context of small networks from an information theoretic point of view, there are still many open problems in terms of how to realize its full benefits in large-scale networks through efficient resource allocation. In particular, such performance optimization requires the knowledge of global channel information (including that for sourcedestination, source-relay, and relay-destination channels) and heterogeneous resource constraints among users. Centralized information exchange and coordination, however, typically do not scale well with the network size This motivates our study of distributed resource allocation algorithms for cooperative communications.
Resource allocation in cooperative networks has attracted attention from the research community only recently. Related work in this area can be divided into two categories: centralized (e.g., [6] , [7] ) and distributed (e.g., [8] - [12] ). For example, in [6] , Nosratinia and Hunter proposed a centralized approach for grouping and partner selection to achieve maximal network-wide diversity. In [7] , Ng and Yu designed centralized resource allocation algorithm for power control, bandwidth allocation, relay selection and relay strategy choice in an Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) based relay network. Bletsas et al. in [8] proposed a distributed relay selection scheme, where one user chooses the "best" end-to-end path among many relays based on instantaneous channel measurements. In [9] , Savazzi and Spagnolini considered distributed power control for a single user multiple hop transmission. Himsoon et al. in [10] investigated the relay selection and power management schemes for lifetime extension in wireless sensor networks. Annavajjala et al. in [11] studied the optimal power control problem for different cooperative protocols under high Signal to Interference-plusnoise Ratio (SINR) approximation for a single user and multiple relays. Wang et al. in [12] investigated resource allocation for cooperative transmission using Stackelberg games. However, the above work did not consider distributed resource allocation for multiple users (source-destination pairs) and multiple relays, where each user is allowed to use more than one than one relay and each relay can help more than one users.
In this paper, we focus on answering the following two questions: 1) "When to relay", i.e., when is it beneficial for a user to use the relay(s)? and 2) "How to relay", i.e., how should a user choose the relay(s) and how should each relay allocate its resource (transmission power) among multiple competing users? We address these two issues by designing an auction-based resource allocation framework. Auction theory [13] has recently been introduced to several areas of wireless communications (e.g., time slot allocation [14] , power control [15] , and cognitive radio networking [16] ). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that applies auction theory in designing resource allocation schemes for cooperative communications.
We consider two network objectives: fairness and efficiency. Both are difficult to achieve even in a centralized fashion. This is because users' rate increases are non-smooth and 0733-8716/08/$25.00 c 2008 IEEE non-concave in the relay's transmission power, and thus the performance optimization problem is non-convex. We propose two auction mechanism, the SNR auction and the power auction, which achieve the desired network objectives in a distributed fashion under certain technical conditions. In both auctions, each user decides "when to relay" based on a simple threshold policy that is locally computable. The question of "how to relay" is answered by a simple weighted proportional allocation among users who use the relay. The power auction achieves the efficiency allocation, and the SNR auction offers a flexible approach to achieve various tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency. Moreover, we show that the desirable outcomes of the auctions (i.e., Nash Equilibrium) can be achieved by users' greedy best response updates with local information in a completely asynchronous manner. The results are quite general and are applicable to wireless networks with multiple relays at different locations with different resource constraints. Simulation results demonstrate optimality, fairness, and convergence of the proposed auctions.
Next we present the system model and network objectives in Section II. In Section III, two auction mechanisms are proposed, their mathematical properties are analyzed, and the algorithms for achieving the Nash Equilibrium in a distributed fashion are shown. Extensions to the multiple relay case are discussed in Section IV. Simulation results are shown in Section V and we conclude in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NETWORK OBJECTIVES

A. System Model
We focus our discussions on the amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperation protocol [2] in this paper. Other cooperation protocols can be analyzed in a similar fashion. We begin by considering a simple system model as in Fig. 1 , where there are one relay node r and a set I = (1, ..., I) of sourcedestination pairs (i.e., users). Each user i includes a source node s i and a destination node d i . The case of multiple relays will be discussed in Section IV.
We assume that different users transmit their signals using non-overlapping frequency bands and thus they do not interfere with each other. For each user i, the cooperative transmission consists of two phases.
In Phase 1, source s i broadcasts its information so that it can be received by both destination d i and relay r, respectively, as
and
Here P si represents the fixed transmit power of source s i , X si is the transmitted information symbol with unit energy at source s i , G si,di and G si,r are the channel gains from s i to destination d i and relay r, respectively, and n di and n r are additive white Gaussian noises. Without loss of generality, we assume that the noise level is the same for all links and is denoted by σ 2 . We also assume that the transmission frame length is small compared with the channel coherence time such that all channel gains are fixed during the time of interest. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) obtained at destination
In Phase 2, relay r amplifies Y si,r with power P r,di and forwards it to destination d i . The received signal at destination
where
is the unit-energy transmitted signal that relay r receives from source s i in Phase 1, G r,di is the channel gain from relay r to destination d i , and n di is the received noise at Phase 2.
Substituting (2) into (5), we can rewrite the received signal (4) as
Using (6), the relayed SNR at destination d i in Phase 2 is
Now we are ready to calculate the achievable rate at destination d i . At a given transmission time, user i has two choices:
1) Use Phase 1 only and achieve rate (in bps/Hz)
where W is the signal bandwidth. 2) Use both phases and achieve rate (at the output of maximal ratio combining)
The coefficient 1/2 is due to the fact that cooperative transmission uses half of the resources (e.g., time slots, frequency bands, orthogonal codes). Since Γ si,r,di is the extra SNR increase compared with the direct transmission, we also denote
Comparing these two choices, the rate increase that user i can obtain comparing with the case of no relay is
which is nonnegative since the source can always choose not to use the relay and thereby obtain zero rate increase. R i is a function of the channel gains of the source-destination, sourcerelay and relay-destination links, as well as the transmission power of the source and the relay. In particular, R i is a non-decreasing, non-smooth, and non-concave function of the relay transmission power P r,di , as illustrated in Fig. 2 . We assume that the source transmission power P si (for all users i) and the relay's total power P are fixed. The relay determines the allocation of its transmission power among users, P r (P r,di , ∀i ∈ I), such that the total power constraint is not violated, i.e.,
B. Network Objectives: Efficiency and Fairness
We consider two different network objectives: efficiency and fairness. An efficient power allocation P efficient r maximizes the total rate increase of all users, i.e. solves the following problem, max
In many cases, an efficient allocation discriminates against users who are far away from the relay. To avoid this, we also consider a fair power allocation P fair r , which solves the following problem,
subject to
Here 1 {·} is the indicator function, and q i is a user dependent priority parameter. When q i = 1 for each i, all users who use the relay will have the same marginal utility, which leads to strict fairness among users. 1 It is possible to assign different weights to different users to achieve different Qualities of Service. One such example is to let
i.e., q i represents user i's eagerness to gain extra SNR increase by using the relay. The intuition behind Problem (14) is that for all users that choose to use the relay, the corresponding SNR should be maximized subject to the "weighted marginal utility equalization" condition. This can be translated into the minimization of the common coefficient c due to the concavity of R i in terms of SNR i in the proper regime. Numerical examples for both equal weights and different weights are shown in Section V.
We notice that a fair or efficient allocation is Pareto optimal, i.e., no user's rate can be further increased without decreasing the rate of another user. However, an efficient or fair allocation need not fully utilize the resources at the relay, i.e., i∈I P r,di can be less than P . This could happen, for example, when the relay is far away from all users so that allowing the relay to transmit half of the time will only decrease the total achievable rate. This is very different from most previous network resource allocation problems (e.g. [16] ), in which the network performance is maximized only if the resource is fully utilized.
Since R i (P r,di ) is non-smooth and non-concave, both Problems (13) and (14) are difficult to solve even in a centralized fashion. In the rest of the paper, we will propose two auction mechanisms, and quantify the technical conditions under which the auction mechanisms solve the above problems in a distributed fashion.
III. AUCTION MECHANISMS
An auction is a decentralized market mechanism for allocating resources. The essence of an auction is a game, where the players are the bidders, the strategies are the bids, and both allocations and payments are functions of the bids. One well known auction is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction [13] , which requires gathering global information from the network and performing centralized computations. To overcome the limitation of the VCG auction, we propose two simple auctions, the SNR auction and the power auction, both of which have simple rules as described next.
2
SNR Auction and Power Auction
• Information: Besides the public and local information (i.e., W, P, σ 2 , P si , G si,di ), each user i also knows the channel gains G si,r and G r,di , through feedback from relay r. The relay announces a positive reserve bid β > 0 and a price π > 0 to all users before the auction starts.
• Bids: User i submits a scalar b i ≥ 0 to the relay.
• Allocation: The relay allocates transmit power according to
• Payments: In an SNR auction, source i pays the relay 
(17) For notational simplicity, we omit the dependence on β and other system parameters.
If the reserve bid β = 0, then the resource allocation in (16) depends only on the ratio of the bids. A bidding profile kb (for any k > 0) leads to the same resource allocation as b, which is not desirable in practice. That is why we need a positive reserve bid. However, the value of β is not important as long as it is positive. For example, if we increase β to k β, then users can simply scale b to k b (for any k > 0), which leads to the same resource allocation. For simplicity, we choose β = 1 in all the simulations in Section V.
The desirable outcome of an auction is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is a bidding profile b * such that no user wants to deviate unilaterally, i.e.,
Define user i's best response (for fixed b −i and price π) as
which in general could be a set. An NE is also a fixed point solution of all users' best responses. We would like to answer the following four questions for both auctions: 1) When does an NE exist? 2) When is the NE unique? 3) What are the properties of the NE? 4) How can we reach the NE in a distributed fashion?
2 Both auctions are similar to the ones proposed in [16] . However, here we consider the problem of relay resource allocation in a multiple-hop wireless network, which is different from the sing-hop wireless network considered in [16] . For example, due to the unique characteristics of the relay network, especially the non-smooth and non-concave nature of the rate increase function (e.g., Fig. 2 ), calculating the best response functions here demands a completely new method and leads to a very different threshold policy. We also consider the multiple relay case in Section IV, whereas [16] considers the problem of allocating resource only at a single measurement point. 
A. SNR Auction
Let us first study the users' best responses (e.g., (19) 
Function g s i (π) represents the maximum payoff a user can achieve if it decides to use the relay. It is clear that when g s i (π) < 0, the user is better off by not using the relay. Both π s i andπ s i can be calculated based on local information (i.e., no information exchange is needed among different users), and one could be larger than the other depending on the specific system parameters.
Theorem 1: In an SNR auction, user i's unique best response function is 
a large SNR increase that cannot be achieved even if all the resource is allocated to it. This is reflected by an infinite bid in (23). Next we consider the second case whereπ
. In this case, user i either cannot obtain a positive payoff or cannot achieve the desired SNR increase, and thus the best response is either 0 or ∞. A detailed proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.
Combining (16) and (22), we know that if an NE exist, the relay power allocated for user i is
and i∈I
The strict inequality is due to the positive reserve bid β, and later we will show that the resulting resource waste can be made arbitrarily small under appropriate conditions.
Next, we need to find the fixed point of all users' best responses, i.e., the NE. A trivial case would beπ In an SNR-regular network, at least one user is interested in using the relay. A randomly generated network with many users and a relay will be SNR-regular with high probability, unless all users have good direct gains or the relay is far away from the users. [16] , the unique NE in Theorem 2 might not be a continuous function of π, due to the discontinuity of the best response function as shown in Fig. 3 . This has been observed in the simulation results described in Section V. In particular, the unique NE could be all zero for any price π > π s th , even if the network is SNR-regular.
It can be seen that the "weighted marginal utility equalization" property of a fair allocation (i.e., the constraint in Problem (14) ) is satisfied at the NE of the SNR auction. However, there is always some "resource waste" due to the positive reserve bid β (i.e., some power will never be allocated to any user). Nevertheless, by choosing a price π larger than but very close to π s th , we could reduce the resource waste to a minimum and approximate the fair allocation. Formally, we define a reduced feasible set parameterized by δ as
(25)
Finally, we want to mention that the threshold price π s th is difficult to find analytically. This means that the price π needs to be adjusted through a "trial-and-error" process. In particular, the price needs to be increased when users' bids are too large and decreased when the resource waste due to β is too large. Since users' best responses in (23) are monotonically decreasing in price, a bi-section search of the price can lead to the desirable outcome.
B. Power Auction
For a power auction, we can also derive a closed-form solution for the best response functions, which are much more complicated compared with those for the SNR auction. To simplify the notations, we defineP si,r P si G si,r . Furthermore, we define two functions (z i (π) and g 
and 
The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to that of Theorem 1 and thus is omitted due to space limitations. Theorem 4 is applicable for the general SNR regime. In the case of low SNR, i.e., when Γ si,di and SNR i (b i , b −i ) are small for all i, we have
In this case, we can show thatπ
In other words, when the direct channel gain between source and destination is larger than the channel gain between source and relay, a user will never use the relay in the low SNR regime.
In terms of the existence, uniqueness and properties of the NE, we have the following results, which are similar in spirit to Theorems 2 and 3 for the SNR auction. The detailed proofs are omitted. We can see that for both auctions, the conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and effectiveness (fairness for SNR auction and efficiency for power auction) are quite similar. This is due to the linearity of the best response functions in both cases, which again is due to the weighted proportional allocation rule of the relay power in (16).
C. Distributed Iterative Best Response Updates
The last issue we want to address is how the NE can be reached in a distributed fashion. It is clear that the best response function in (23) can be calculated in a distributed fashion with limited information feedback from the relay. However, each user does not have enough information to calculate the best responses of other users, which prevents it from directly calculating the NE. Nevertheless, the NE can be achieved in a distributed fashion if we allow the users to iteratively update their bids based on best response functions in an asynchronous fashion.
Let us first consider the synchronous updates, where users update their bids b (t) at time t according to the best response functions b i (t) = B i (b −i (t − 1) , π), based on other users' bids b −i (t − 1) at time t − 1. Taking the SNR auction as an example, each user updates according to
To implement (33) directly, each user i needs to know the sum of all other users' bids, which may not be possible in practice. However, we can show that (33) can be written in an equivalent form as
where (35) applies. It can be seen that f (π) does not equal 1 unless the two terms are the same. For the power auction, we can similarly show that the best response update can be written as
where f
is similar to (35) (with more complicated notation) and is also locally computable.
In practice, users may not update their bids in each time slot. Therefore, we need to prove the convergence of the algorithm under asynchronous updates. The complete asynchronous best response update algorithm is given in Algorithm 1 3 , where
depending on which auction the users participate in. 
From (37), each user updates its bid at least once during any time interval of length B slots. The exact value of B is not important and need not be known by the users. 
end if 8: end for 9: Go to Line 3.
Theorem 7:
If there exists a unique nonzero NE in the SNR or power auction, there always exists a lowerbound bid vector b = {b i } i∈I and an upperbound bid vectorb = b i i∈I , under which Algorithm 1 globally converges to the unique NE.
In practice, it is sufficient to choose b to be a sufficiently small and positive vector andb to be a sufficiently large and finite vector. To prove Theorem 7, we can first verify that the best response update in (33) is in fact a standard interference function [19] , and the rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 4 in [19] .
IV. EXTENSIONS TO MULTIPLE RELAY NETWORKS
The proposed auction-based resource allocation algorithms can be generalized to networks with multiple relays. Let us define the set of relays as K = {1, ..., K}. Each relay k ∈ K announces a price π k and a reserve bid β k , without knowing the prices and reserve bids of other relays. Each user i ∈ I submits a nonnegative bid vector b i = {b ik } k∈K , one component for each relay. Based on the bids, relay k allocates user i with transmission power
where P k is the fixed total transmission power of relay k. This leads to an SNR increase of user i of
.
(39) The total information rate that user i achieves is
This includes a special case in which user i does not use any relay (i.e., SNR ik = 0 for all k ∈ K). It is clear that SNR ik > 0 if and only if b ik > 0. Notice that using more relays leads to higher total SNR increase k SNR ik , but also leads to a smaller coefficient 1/ k 1 { SNR ik >0} + 1 . User i needs to compare the total achievable rate under difference choices of relays, and choose one that yields the highest rate increase.
We first consider the SNR auction where user i's payment
Theorem 8: In an SNR auction with multiple relays, a user i either does not use any relay, or only uses one relay r k(i) with the smallest weighted price, i.e., k(i) = arg min k∈K π k q ik .
Theorem 8 can be proved by examining the first order conditions that need to be satisfied at the NE. In case there are multiple relays that announce the same smallest weighted price, user i can randomly choose one of them. The choice of relay can be made by a user before knowing other users' bids. This implies that we can divide a multiple-relay network into K + 1 clusters of nodes: each of the first K clusters contains one relay node and the users who use this relay, and the last cluster contains users that do not use any relay. Then we can analyze each cluster independently as a single-relay network as in Section III-A. Now consider the power auction where user i's payment is C i = k π k P r k ,di . There are several key differences here compared with the SNR auction. First, a user may choose to use multiple relays simultaneously here. User i's best response can be written in the following linear form:
There are two key differences here compared with the singlerelay power auction. First, to calculate f cases of choosing relays. For example, when there are two relays in the network, a user needs to consider four cases: not using any relay, using relay 1 only, using relay 2 only, and using both relays. On the other hand, necessary condition for the existence of an NE as well as conditions for uniqueness are not straightforward to specify, and are left for future research.
Finally, note that if there exists a unique NE in the SNR auction or power auction with multiple relays, the asynchronous best response updates of the users will globally converge to that NE.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
For illustration purposes, here we provide simulation results for a single relay network. We first simulate two auction mechanisms for a two-user network. As shown in Fig. 4 , the locations of the two sources (s 1 and s 2 ) and two destinations (d 1 and d 2 ) are fixed at (200m,-25m), (0m,25m), (0m,-25m), (200m,25m) . The x coordinate of the relay node r at 80m, and its y coordinate varies within the range [-200m,200m ]. In the simulation, the relay moves along the dotted line. The propagation loss factor is set to 4, and the channel gains are distance based (i.e., time-varying fading is not considered here). The transmit power between a source and its destination is P i = 0.01W, the noise level is σ 2 = 10 −11 W, and the total power of the relay node is P = 0.1W.
In Fig. 5 , we show the individual rate increases of both users in both auctions. The weights in the SNR auction are chosen as q i = 1 for each user i. We first consider the power auction. The individual rate increases under the power auction are similar as that achieved under a VCG auction (not shown here) and thus are efficient. Since the relay movement trajectory is relatively closer to source s 2 than to source s 1 , user 2 achieves an overall better performance compared with user 1. In particular, user 2 achieves a peak rate increase of 1.35 bps/Hz when the relay is at location 25m (y-axis), compared with the peak rate increase of 0.56 bps/Hz achieved by user 1 when the relay is at location -25m. Things are very different in the SNR auction, where the resource allocation is fair. In particular, since the distance between a source and its destination is the same for each of the users, both users achieve the same positive rate increases when they both use the relay. This is the case when the relay is between locations -60m and 10m. At other locations, users simply choose not to use the relay since they cannot both get equal rate increase while obtaining a positive payoff. This shows the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness.
In Fig. 6 , we show the individual rate increases for two auctions, with the weights in the SNR auction set to q 1 = 0.5 and q 2 = 1. Here user 2 achieves a higher rate increase than user 1 in the SNR auction, due to its higher weight. By adjusting the weights of different users, the SNR auction can achieve different tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency.
Next, we consider the case where there are 20 users in the network, with their source nodes and destination nodes randomly and uniformly located within the square field that has the same range of [-150m,150m] on both the x-axis and the y-axis. A single relay is fixed at the location (0m,0m). We change the total transmission power P of the relay from 0.04 W to 1 W. Figs. 7 and 8 show the corresponding simulation results. Each point in the figures represents the averaged result over 100 randomly generated network topologies. All users have the same weights in SNR auction. With an increasing amount of resource at the relay node, the total network rate increase improves in both auctions (Fig. 7) , and the power auction achieves higher rate increase than the SNR auction. Fig. 8 shows the variance of the rate increase (among the users with positive rate increase), and it is clear that the SNR Finally, we show the convergence of Algorithm 1. We consider a three user network, where the three transmitters are located at (100m,-25m), (-100m,25m) and (100m,5m), and the three receivers are located at (-100m,25m), (100m,25m) and (-100m,5m). The relay is located at (0m,-2m). We simulate the SNR auction in this case. Three users randomly and independently choose to update their own bids in each time slot with probability 0.1, 0.5 and 1, respectively. Convergence is clearly observed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels and cooperation among users. In this paper, we have proposed two auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, to distributively coordinate the relay power allocation among users. Under a fixed price announced by a single relay, we have shown that although each user has a non-smooth, non-concave utility function, its best response function can nevertheless explicitly be calculated locally based on a simple threshold policy. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in both auctions has been proved using nonnegative matrix theory. Furthermore, under properly chosen prices, the power auction has been shown to achieve the efficient allocation, and the SNR auction has been seen to be flexible in achieving various tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency depending on the priority weights. Furthermore, we have shown that users can achieve the unique NE in a completely distributed and asynchronous fashion. We have also shown that the main properties of the two auctions are applicable for networks with multiple relays at different locations.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
In an SNR auction, user i's payoff function is
where (43) is true. The best response function is
The difficulty of finding B i (b −i , π) is due mainly to the max operation in (43), which leads to non-smoothness and non-concavity of the payoff function. Next, we solve for B i (b −i , π) in two steps. First, by temporarily ignoring the max operation, we solve for the following modified best response function,
where the modified payoff function is
DifferentiatingŨ i (b i , b −i , π) with respect to b i , we have
It is clear that ∂ SNR i (b i , b −i ) /∂b i is strictly positive. Furthermore, the term in the brackets on the right hand side of (47) is strictly decreasing in b i . If the price is appropriate such that there exists a b i so that the term in the brackets equals zero, we have found the best response. If the price is too high (or too low), the best response is 0 (or ∞). In summary, we can show that the unique best responseB i (b −i , π) in this case can be written as
where the equation on the top of the following page is true. π 
